The Inland Group's Non-Traded REITs Destroyed $11.9 Billion of Investor Wealth
(Feb 2014)
Last week we wrote about how investors in a non-traded REIT, Inland Diversified Real Estate Trust, had lost $200 million compared to traded REITs even though it announced a merger with a traded REIT, covered in our blog post"More Non-Traded REIT Carnage: Inland Diversified's Investors Have Lost 40%, Not Gained 31%".
Continuing our blog posts and working papers on non-traded REITs, today we report on how investors fared in five non-traded REITs sponsored by affiliates of The Inland Real...
Willow Fund's Hedging, Investing and Speculating in Distressed Debt With Credit Default Swaps
(Jan 2014)
In a recent post we demonstrated how the Willow Fund's purchase of credit default swaps evolved from hedging a portion of its distressed debt to swamping the portfolio with enormous short positions in distressed debt. In this post, we explain why the Willow Fund's use of credit default swaps was inconsistent with its repeated disclosures that:
... The Fund may use a variety of special investment techniques to hedge a portion of its investment portfolio against various risks or other factors...
Credit Default Swaps on Steroids: UBS's Willow Fund
(Jan 2014)
We previously published a working paper on how investors in Oppenheimer's Champion Income Fund lost 80% in 2008 when peer group funds lost about 25%. Our Champion Income Fund paper is available on our website. Oppenheimer had increased Champion Income Fund's exposure to CMBS through credit default swaps and total return swaps in 2007 and 2008. Figure 1 reproduces a figure from our 2010 paper which demonstrates that the leverage Oppenheimer took on through the swaps fully explained the...
Another Example of Non-Traded REITs' Wealth Destruction: Columbia Property Trust (Wells REIT II) Cost Investors $4.4 Billion
(Jan 2014)
Non-traded REITs are illiquid investments, not listed on public exchanges and with little to no secondary market trading. Their offering documents typically claim that after some period of time, perhaps 5-10 years, the REIT intends to list on an exchange, merge with another company, or in some other way allow investors to sell their shares but for many non-traded REITs, this "liquidity event" never occurs.
However, even if a non-traded REIT lists on a major exchange, that does not mean that...
Monte Carlo Simulation, Explained
(Nov 2013)
Valuing products with exotic derivatives can be difficult since these products typically have complex payoff formulas. One of the most flexible methods for valuing such products is called Monte Carlo simulation. At SLCG, we use Monte Carlo simulation in a lot of our work, so we thought it would be helpful to explain a bit about it and show how it can be used to estimate the future returns of an asset.
The basic idea behind Monte Carlo simulation is to determine the statistical properties...
Athlete-Backed Securities and Credit Risk
(Nov 2013)
The financial media has been abuzz about Fantex, a brokerage firm that is offering investments linked to the earnings of professional athletes. Their first offering was linked to 20% of the future earnings of Houston Texans running back Arian Foster, and the second was for a 10% interest in the future earnings of San Francisco 49ers tight end Vernon Davis.*At first, the plan was met with some skepticism (and some ridicule), which was only magnified when last Sunday both Foster and Davis...
Structured Product Fees and Credit Risk
(Nov 2013)
Kevin Dugan noted in the April edition of Bloomberg's Structured Notes Brief that "Citigroup collected the highest average fees in the first quarter [of 2013] among the 10 biggest underwriters of U.S. structured notes." This got us wondering, is there any relationship between the credit quality of the underwriter and the fees the underwriter collects? If investors truly understood credit risk, issuers with higher credit risk would presumably have to structure products with lower fees to...
The Consequences and Implications of TIC Investments
(Nov 2013)
The research we have outlined all this week strongly suggests that TIC interests are exceptionally poor investments. We have focused our posts on what a thorough due diligence on the TICs should have revealed at the time of issuance. But you may be wondering, what happened to these TICs? What sort of returns did investors receive?
To our knowledge, there is no retrospective study of TIC returns. But in our experience, the vast majority of TIC properties suffered significant impairments during...
Welcome to Tenancies-in-Common (TIC) Week on the SLCG Blog
(Oct 2013)
Today, SLCG posted a new research paper, Large Sample Valuations of Tenancies in Common . In it, we value 194 TICs, totaling $2.2 billion in equity and representing approximately 17% of the TIC industry from 2004 to 2009. Our paper complements our earlier research on TICs ("What is a TIC Worth?" and "Private Placement Real Estate Valuation"), and is the most extensive empirical study of TICs to date. This week we will be summarizing the results of our research in a series of blog posts. But...
