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Our experts frequently write blog posts about the findings of the research we are conducting.

Displaying 10 out of 29 results for "Structured CDs Week".

Who Will Stop Aegis as it Continues to Harm Investors?

(Jun 2024)

By Craig McCann and Mike Yan

You can download a PDF of this article to print or email here

Introduction

Aegis is one of the highest risk brokerage firms in the country and is using its retail customer accounts to stuff the worst underwritings in the country. Sadly, unless some authority stops Aegis, an update later in the year will show further investor wreckage as a result of Aegis's disregard for its most basic duties.

In March 2024, we documented that Aegis was systematically...

Starwood REIT Misleads, Like BREIT only Worse!

(Apr 2024)

By Craig McCann and Regina Meng

You can download a pdf of this article to print or email here.

In late 2022 we analyzed BREIT and concluded that BREIT had been systematically inflating its NAV, smoothing its returns and misleading investors. The intervening 18 months have confirmed our opinions.

We focused on BREIT because it was a juggernaut and a poster child for the nontraded REIT industry trying to rebuild after its prior "lifecycle" flimflam was no longer tenable in the face of...

Autocallables Part IV: Issuers' Day-1 Value Mischief

(Mar 2024)

By Craig McCann and Mike Yan

Earlier this week we posted about the $122 billion in autocallable structured products sold in the past 4 years, mostly issued by UBS, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Citigroup and Morgan Stanley. You can read that post here.

We illustrated features of autocallables with reference to the five notes linked to the stock price of Lucid issued by Credit Suisse and Citigroup in a post available here and pointed out a particularly poorly timed issuance by Citigroup linked...

Autocallables 2024 Part III: SVB, Really?

(Mar 2024)

By Craig McCann and Mike Yan

On Monday, we documented that $122 billion in autocallable structured products have been sold in the past 4 years, mostly issued by UBS, Goldman Sachs, JP Morgan, Citigroup and Morgan Stanley. You can read our first note on autocallables here.

Yesterday, we illustrated features of autocallables with reference to the five notes linked to the stock price of Lucid issued by Credit Suisse and Citigroup. You can read our second note here.

Today, we point...

Autocallables 2024 Part II: Lucid-linked Notes

(Mar 2024)

By Craig McCann and Mike Yan

Yesterday, we described the rapid growth in Autocallable structured products; $122 billion have been sold in the past 4 years. You can read our first post on autocallables here.

In this, our second, post, we illustrate features of autocallables with reference to the five notes linked to the stock price of Lucid.

Our third post, available here, highlights a Silicon Valley Bank linked autocallable sold by Citigroup after the close on March 9, 2023 right...

Autocallables 2024 Part I

(Mar 2024)

By Craig McCann and Mike Yan

Introduction We have published extensively on structured products over the past 20 years. We published two papers dealing specifically with autocallable structured products - one in 2011 and one in 2015.[1] Since 2015, while we were focused on other research projects, the issuance of autocallable structured products has exploded, issuers have become more creative, the variety of products has proliferated and the potential for investor harm has increased...

Another Example of Apparent Marking-the-Close

(Mar 2024)

By Craig McCann and Mike Yan

You can download a PDF of this article to print or email here

Introduction

We recently posted research into stock issuances solely underwritten by Aegis Capital. We concluded that investors, including many Aegis' retail customers, suffered $3.0 billion to $5 billion in losses in recent years as a result of Aegis' conduct. You can view that post here.

We also concluded that in at least three instances either Aegis marked the close or looked the...

Aegis Capital is Farm-to-Table Securities Fraud Purveyor, Harming Investors at Least $5 Billion!

(Mar 2024)

By Craig McCann and Mike Yan

You can download a PDF copy of this post to print or email here.

You can download an Excel file containing some of our analysis of Aegis' sole underwritten offerings here.

Introduction

Aegis Capital is one of the worst few retail brokerage firms based on complaints and investors should avoid it at all costs. You can see our recent post on bad brokerage firms here 2024 Brokerage Firm Risk Rankings

In addition to its retail brokerage business,...

Howard Capital Management Funds Charge High Fees to Misuse Leveraged ETFs

(Jan 2024)

By Craig McCann and Susan Song

You can download a copy of this note to print or email here.

Introduction

Howard Capital Management ("HCM") is a SEC-registered RIA based in Roswell, GA.[1] In addition to advising individual accounts, it manages mutual funds and ETFs. It claims to use proprietary technical analysis, HCM-BuyLine(R), to market-time the funds' asset allocations.

Without any risk disclosure, HCM's mutual funds buy and hold leveraged ETFs for much longer periods than is...

Beneficient's Trading is Bad Omen for GWG Bondholder Recoveries

(Jun 2023)

By Craig McCann and Regina Meng.

We have found so many red flags in GWG Holdings' public filings years before its bankruptcy filing in 2022 that no unconflicted broker would have recommended GWG's L Bonds and no fully informed investor would have bought them. Nonetheless, $1.3 billion face value of L Bonds remained outstanding at the time of the bankruptcy. These bonds were sold by third tier brokerage firms in pursuit of undisclosed commissions as high as 8%.

We will tell a more...

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