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Our experts frequently write blog posts about the findings of the research we are conducting.

Displaying 10 out of 79 results for "Reverse Mortgages".

Autocallables 2024 Part I

(Mar 2024)

By Craig McCann and Mike Yan

Introduction We have published extensively on structured products over the past 20 years. We published two papers dealing specifically with autocallable structured products - one in 2011 and one in 2015.[1] Since 2015, while we were focused on other research projects, the issuance of autocallable structured products has exploded, issuers have become more creative, the variety of products has proliferated and the potential for investor harm has increased...

Aegis Capital is Farm-to-Table Securities Fraud Purveyor, Harming Investors at Least $5 Billion!

(Mar 2024)

By Craig McCann and Mike Yan

You can download a PDF copy of this post to print or email here.

You can download an Excel file containing some of our analysis of Aegis' sole underwritten offerings here.

Introduction

Aegis Capital is one of the worst few retail brokerage firms based on complaints and investors should avoid it at all costs. You can see our recent post on bad brokerage firms here 2024 Brokerage Firm Risk Rankings

In addition to its retail brokerage business,...

Howard Capital Management Funds Charge High Fees to Misuse Leveraged ETFs

(Jan 2024)

By Craig McCann and Susan Song

You can download a copy of this note to print or email here.

Introduction

Howard Capital Management ("HCM") is a SEC-registered RIA based in Roswell, GA.[1] In addition to advising individual accounts, it manages mutual funds and ETFs. It claims to use proprietary technical analysis, HCM-BuyLine(R), to market-time the funds' asset allocations.

Without any risk disclosure, HCM's mutual funds buy and hold leveraged ETFs for much longer periods than is...

GWG's Decade-Long Fraud Started Well Before Beneficient Joined In

(Aug 2023)

By Craig McCann and Regina Meng.

Three Wall Street Journal stories describe alleged diversion of assets at GWG/Beneficient in 2019 and later to entities controlled by its CEO.[1] The WSJ stories mention an SEC investigation into accounting practices at GWG/Beneficient focused on the treatment of intra-company transactions and the calculation of comical "goodwill" Beneficient put on its books as it combined with GWG. In addition to these post 2018 issues, GWG's use of demonstrably unreliable...

Non-Traded REIT Conflicts Run Amok: VRM I, VRM II and MVP, MVP II

(Apr 2017)

Introduction

SLCG has written extensively about pervasive conflicts of interest in non-traded REITs arising because a non-traded REIT's sponsor, advisor, selling agents, and major suppliers are often affiliated entities that benefit more from creating the non-traded REIT than from running the REIT profitably. See our blog posts on REITs. SLCG economists have also published peer-reviewed articles on non-traded REITs, including An Empirical Analysis of Non-Traded REITsⁱ.

A collection of...

This is why UBS paid the SEC $15 Million over Reverse Convertible Structured Products

(Sep 2016)

The Securities and Exchange Commission today announced a $15 million settlement with UBS over structured products linked to high volatility stocks today. The SEC press release announcing the settlement and its Order Instituting Proceedings are available on the SEC website. This post explains the underlying notes and why UBS may have paid the SEC a substantial settlement over sales practices related to UBS's reverse convertible notes ("RCNs").

UBS sold thousands of structured notes to retail...

More Impossible Trade Prices Caused by Auto-liquidators: Option Combinations

(Dec 2015)

In three previous blog posts, we documented how auto-liquidators execute option trades at distorted prices to their clients' detriment. The price distortions are caused by the price impact of large sell or buy orders on thinly traded securities. These distortions were reversed within minutes, but not before causing investors millions of dollars of unnecessary losses.

In "The Recent Market Turmoil Spells Trouble for Auto-liquidators like Interactive Brokers", we showed that thinly traded...

Only a Faulty Auto-liquidator Pays More for An Option Than it Can Ever Be Worth

(Nov 2015)

In two previous blog posts we documented how auto-liquidators appear to have executed option trades at distorted prices to their clients' detriment on August 24, 2015. The price distortions were caused by massive sell or buy orders on thinly traded securities being dumped into the market by auto-liquidation programs. These distortions were reversed within minutes, but not before causing investors millions of dollars of unnecessary losses.

In "The Recent Market Turmoil Spells Trouble for...

Securities-Based Lending

(Jun 2015)

In this blog post I summarize my recently published working paper, "Securities-Based Lending".

Introduction

The securities industry has long targeted the liability side of the customer's balance sheet as an opportunity to cross-sell banking products, increase wallet share, and diversify revenue streams away from cyclical trading commissions. In the current euphoric market environment, with portfolio values soaring and borrowing rates historically low, lending to customers has become "Wall...

Enforcement Actions: Week in Review - June 5th, 2015

(Jun 2015)

SEC ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS

Merrill Lynch Admits Using Inaccurate Data for Short Sale Orders, Agrees to $11 Million Settlement
June 1, 2015 (Litigation Release No. 105)
An SEC investigation found some of Merrill Lynch's programs to execute short sale trades were using inaccurate and old data. Merrill Lynch and other broker-dealers are required to maintain an up to date easy-to-borrow (ETB) list composed of stocks that are readily accessible to borrow for short sale orders. Merrill Lynch...

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