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Our experts frequently write blog posts about the findings of the research we are conducting.

Displaying 41-50 out of 160 results for "Short".

This is How We Determined Investors Lost $27.7 Billion Investing in Non-Traded REITs

(Apr 2014)

Earlier this week we posted the summary results of our investigation into the performance of 27 non-traded REITs which had had a liquidity event by December 31, 2013. We found that investors are $27.7 billion worse as a result of investing in these 27 REITs rather than investing in a diversified portfolio of traded REITs. The post titled "Retail Investors Have Lost at Least $27.7 billion as a Result of Non-Traded REITs" is available on our blog.

Figuring out this $27.7 billion shortfall...

Retail Investors Have Lost at Least $27.7 billion as a Result of Non-Traded REITs

(Apr 2014)

As part of our effort to help investors avoid non-traded REITs, we have written over 25 blog posts on this defective investment type. We have noted in our research that because of high costs, illiquidity, lack of transparency and conflicts of interest, non-traded REITs should underperform liquid, low-cost traded REITs. A number of our blog posts including our post on the early trading in NYRT last week, titled "NYRT's Listing is More Evidence That Even the Non-Traded REITs Winners Are...

Risk and Return in UBS's Willow Fund

(Mar 2014)

In four blog posts we have detailed the fall of UBS's Willow Fund. See Credit Default Swaps on Steroids: UBS's Willow Fund, Willow Fund's Hedging, Investing and Speculating in Distressed Debt With Credit Default Swaps, Further Reckoning of UBS Willow Fund's CDS Losses and UBS Intentionally Misled Willow Fund Investors About its Troubled CDS Portfolio.

The spectacular collapse of the Willow Fund was not the result of general market conditions operating on the Fund's disclosed investment...

UBS Intentionally Misled Willow Fund Investors About its Troubled CDS Portfolio

(Feb 2014)

In three blog posts we explained how the UBS Willow Fund's decision to make a large, highly-leveraged short bet on credit risk contrary to its repeated SEC disclosures caused investors to lose over $200 million between 2007 and 2012 . See Credit Default Swaps on Steroids: UBS's Willow Fund, Willow Fund's Hedging, Investing and Speculating in Distressed Debt With Credit Default Swaps and Further Reckoning of UBS Willow Fund's CDS Losses.

As we demonstrated in our earlier blog posts, the second...

Further Reckoning of UBS Willow Fund's CDS Losses

(Feb 2014)

In previous blog posts we explained how the UBS Willow Fund completed its spectacular multi-year collapse in 2012 largely as a result of its leveraged portfolio of credit default swap (CDS) contracts. See Credit Default Swaps on Steroids: UBS's Willow Fund and Willow Fund's Hedging, Investing and Speculating in Distressed Debt With Credit Default Swaps. Through these CDS contracts, the Willow Fund made a large, highly-leveraged short bet on credit risk contrary to its repeated SEC...

SEC Litigation Releases: Week in Review - February 14th, 2014

(Feb 2014)

SEC Charges James Y. Lee for Defrauding His Advisory Clients
February 14, 2014, (Litigation Release No. 22927)
According to the complaint, James Y. Lee defrauded his advisory clients in several ways including "charg[ing] some clients fees...based on false performance and conceal[ing] from them that they had actually incurred realized losses," failing to disclose information about his background including "a criminal conviction for embezzlement and an SEC cease-and-desist order for his role in...

SEC Litigation Releases: Week in Review - February 7th, 2014

(Feb 2014)

Court of Appeals Denies Stay of Order Compelling Investigative Testimony; Affirms District Court's Exercise of Discretion
February 6, 2014, (Litigation Release No. 22920)
This week the court issued a "summary order denying Edward Daspin's motion for a stay" on a December 2013 order. This means that Daspin is required "to appear for investigative testimony in compliance with an SEC investigative subpoena" and was denied a "request that the SEC be required to pay for Daspin's physician to attend...

Willow Fund's Hedging, Investing and Speculating in Distressed Debt With Credit Default Swaps

(Jan 2014)

In a recent post we demonstrated how the Willow Fund's purchase of credit default swaps evolved from hedging a portion of its distressed debt to swamping the portfolio with enormous short positions in distressed debt. In this post, we explain why the Willow Fund's use of credit default swaps was inconsistent with its repeated disclosures that:
... The Fund may use a variety of special investment techniques to hedge a portion of its investment portfolio against various risks or other factors...

Credit Default Swaps on Steroids: UBS's Willow Fund

(Jan 2014)

We previously published a working paper on how investors in Oppenheimer's Champion Income Fund lost 80% in 2008 when peer group funds lost about 25%. Our Champion Income Fund paper is available on our website. Oppenheimer had increased Champion Income Fund's exposure to CMBS through credit default swaps and total return swaps in 2007 and 2008. Figure 1 reproduces a figure from our 2010 paper which demonstrates that the leverage Oppenheimer took on through the swaps fully explained the...

SEC Litigation Releases: Week in Review - January 10th, 2014

(Jan 2014)

Securities and Exchange Commission v. Diamond Foods, Inc.
January 9, 2014, (Litigation Release No. 22902)
According to the complaint, Diamond Foods, Inc. manipulated walnut costs to report "higher net income and inflated earnings to exceed analysts' estimates for fiscal quarters in 2010 and 2011." According to the complaint against Diamond's former CFO, Steven Neil, Neil "directed the effort to fraudulently underreport money paid to walnut growers." Diamond's former CEO, Michael Mendes, has...

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