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Displaying 61-70 out of 176 results for "Latest Non-Traded REIT Valuations: Not Good".

Another Example of Non-Traded REITs' Wealth Destruction: Columbia Property Trust (Wells REIT II) Cost Investors $4.4 Billion

Non-traded REITs are illiquid investments, not listed on public exchanges and with little to no secondary market trading. Their offering documents typically claim that after some period of time, perhaps 5-10 years, the REIT intends to list on an exchange, merge with another company, or in some other way allow investors to sell their shares but for many non-traded REITs, this "liquidity event" never occurs.

However, even if a non-traded REIT lists on a major exchange, that does not mean that...

The Use of Leverage in the UBS Puerto Rico Closed-End Funds Magnified Losses

The massive declines that hit investors in the UBS Puerto Rico closed-end bond funds in 2013 were especially quick and brutal for fixed income securities which are usually safer investments. In previous posts we have discussed some of the reasons for the precipitous fall in the values of the bond funds and some of the nuances of bond transactions that may have given rise to conflicts of interest between the fund managers and investors. In this post, we will discuss another culprit in the...

Behringer Harvard / TIER REIT Illustrates How Non-Traded REIT Sponsors and Brokers Have Siphoned $10 Billion to $20 Billion (and Counting) From Investors

Sponsors have issued, and brokers had sold, over $85 billion of non-traded real estate investment trusts (REITs) by the end of 2012. These investments are illiquid, high-commissioned, poorly diversified real estate investments. Despite their glaring defects another $20 billion of non-traded REITs were sold to investors in 2013.

Sponsors and brokers have siphoned off at least $20 billion from investors through their sales of non-traded REITs up through 2012. We illustrate the calculation of...

Did UBS Charge its Proprietary Puerto Rico Bond Funds Excessive Markups? Part II

We have previously posted several blog posts about UBS Puerto Rico's collapsing closed-end municipal bond funds including: Trouble in Paradise: UBS Puerto Rico Bond Fund Investors Hit Hard, Diversification and UBS Puerto Rico Bond Fund Losses, Did UBS Charge its Proprietary Puerto Rico Bond Funds Excessive Markups? and Merry Christmas from UBS Asset Managers of Puerto Rico.

UBS has argued that since we couldn't identify which trades in the EMMA data were the UBS bond fund trades and UBS...

Diversification and UBS Puerto Rico Bond Fund Losses

The 19 closed-end bond funds managed by UBS Puerto Rico listed in Table 1 lost $1.66 billion in the first 9 months of 2013. These funds were sold almost exclusively to citizens of Puerto Rico and approximately 70% of the portfolios of these funds were invested in Puerto Rican securities. The percentage losses over the past year range from 38% to 48% for the worst-performing UBS PR funds. These losses are substantially greater than Puerto Rican municipal bonds generally. The Standard and...

Monte Carlo Simulation, Explained

Valuing products with exotic derivatives can be difficult since these products typically have complex payoff formulas. One of the most flexible methods for valuing such products is called Monte Carlo simulation. At SLCG, we use Monte Carlo simulation in a lot of our work, so we thought it would be helpful to explain a bit about it and show how it can be used to estimate the future returns of an asset.

The basic idea behind Monte Carlo simulation is to determine the statistical properties...

Variable Annuity Fees Linked to the VIX -- Part II

In our last post, we discussed a whitepaper that proposed linking the fees in a variable annuity to the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX). That paper ran a simple backtest of a variable annuity fee tied to the VIX over the period from 1990-2012, assuming certain parameters, and then compared the result to a fixed fee annuity over the same period. We have replicated their approach between January 1990 and January 2013 and found that not only are the fees and ending account values comparable, but so...

Variable Annuity Fees Linked to the VIX -- Part I

We've discussed the CBOE Volatility Index -- known as the VIX-- many times before. Essentially, the VIX is a very complex calculation of the expected future variance of the S&P 500 (see the full calculation methodology), and is popularly known as the 'investor fear gauge'. The VIX is not a tradeable asset, but there are VIX options and futures contracts, and those contracts serve as the basis for several VIX-related exchange-traded products (TVIX, XIV, VXXto name a few). The VIX is very...

How Does VolDex Stack Up to the VIX?

We've talked a lot about the idea of using volatility to hedge equity exposure. The basic finding, from our research work and that of others, is that the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) hedges the S&P 500 fairly well. Unfortunately, the VIX is not investable, but is a complicated calculation based on a large strip of options contracts -- i.e., contracts of varying moneyness. Proxies for the VIX, such as rolling VIX futures strategies, are much worse hedges and have a number of problems that make...

Athlete-Backed Securities and Credit Risk

The financial media has been abuzz about Fantex, a brokerage firm that is offering investments linked to the earnings of professional athletes. Their first offering was linked to 20% of the future earnings of Houston Texans running back Arian Foster, and the second was for a 10% interest in the future earnings of San Francisco 49ers tight end Vernon Davis.*At first, the plan was met with some skepticism (and some ridicule), which was only magnified when last Sunday both Foster and Davis...

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