Further Reckoning of UBS Willow Fund's CDS Losses
(Feb 2014)
In previous blog posts we explained how the UBS Willow Fund completed its spectacular multi-year collapse in 2012 largely as a result of its leveraged portfolio of credit default swap (CDS) contracts. See Credit Default Swaps on Steroids: UBS's Willow Fund and Willow Fund's Hedging, Investing and Speculating in Distressed Debt With Credit Default Swaps. Through these CDS contracts, the Willow Fund made a large, highly-leveraged short bet on credit risk contrary to its repeated SEC...
Willow Fund's Hedging, Investing and Speculating in Distressed Debt With Credit Default Swaps
(Jan 2014)
In a recent post we demonstrated how the Willow Fund's purchase of credit default swaps evolved from hedging a portion of its distressed debt to swamping the portfolio with enormous short positions in distressed debt. In this post, we explain why the Willow Fund's use of credit default swaps was inconsistent with its repeated disclosures that:
... The Fund may use a variety of special investment techniques to hedge a portion of its investment portfolio against various risks or other factors...
Credit Default Swaps on Steroids: UBS's Willow Fund
(Jan 2014)
We previously published a working paper on how investors in Oppenheimer's Champion Income Fund lost 80% in 2008 when peer group funds lost about 25%. Our Champion Income Fund paper is available on our website. Oppenheimer had increased Champion Income Fund's exposure to CMBS through credit default swaps and total return swaps in 2007 and 2008. Figure 1 reproduces a figure from our 2010 paper which demonstrates that the leverage Oppenheimer took on through the swaps fully explained the...
The Use of Leverage in the UBS Puerto Rico Closed-End Funds Magnified Losses
(Jan 2014)
The massive declines that hit investors in the UBS Puerto Rico closed-end bond funds in 2013 were especially quick and brutal for fixed income securities which are usually safer investments. In previous posts we have discussed some of the reasons for the precipitous fall in the values of the bond funds and some of the nuances of bond transactions that may have given rise to conflicts of interest between the fund managers and investors. In this post, we will discuss another culprit in the...
Behringer Harvard / TIER REIT Illustrates How Non-Traded REIT Sponsors and Brokers Have Siphoned $10 Billion to $20 Billion (and Counting) From Investors
(Jan 2014)
Sponsors have issued, and brokers had sold, over $85 billion of non-traded real estate investment trusts (REITs) by the end of 2012. These investments are illiquid, high-commissioned, poorly diversified real estate investments. Despite their glaring defects another $20 billion of non-traded REITs were sold to investors in 2013.
Sponsors and brokers have siphoned off at least $20 billion from investors through their sales of non-traded REITs up through 2012. We illustrate the calculation of...
Diversification and UBS Puerto Rico Bond Fund Losses
(Dec 2013)
The 19 closed-end bond funds managed by UBS Puerto Rico listed in Table 1 lost $1.66 billion in the first 9 months of 2013. These funds were sold almost exclusively to citizens of Puerto Rico and approximately 70% of the portfolios of these funds were invested in Puerto Rican securities. The percentage losses over the past year range from 38% to 48% for the worst-performing UBS PR funds. These losses are substantially greater than Puerto Rican municipal bonds generally. The Standard and...
Monte Carlo Simulation, Explained
(Nov 2013)
Valuing products with exotic derivatives can be difficult since these products typically have complex payoff formulas. One of the most flexible methods for valuing such products is called Monte Carlo simulation. At SLCG, we use Monte Carlo simulation in a lot of our work, so we thought it would be helpful to explain a bit about it and show how it can be used to estimate the future returns of an asset.
The basic idea behind Monte Carlo simulation is to determine the statistical properties...
Variable Annuity Fees Linked to the VIX -- Part II
(Nov 2013)
In our last post, we discussed a whitepaper that proposed linking the fees in a variable annuity to the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX). That paper ran a simple backtest of a variable annuity fee tied to the VIX over the period from 1990-2012, assuming certain parameters, and then compared the result to a fixed fee annuity over the same period. We have replicated their approach between January 1990 and January 2013 and found that not only are the fees and ending account values comparable, but so...
