Blog

Our experts frequently write blog posts about the findings of the research we are conducting.

Displaying 41-50 out of 201 results

UBS Puerto Rican Funds Did Not Belong in Puerto Rican Investors' Portfolios

(Feb 2015)

Over the past year, we've posted a dozen commentaries about the UBS Puerto Rican closed end bond funds to our blog.

In Taxes, Puerto Rico Municipal Bonds and the UBS Funds we show that preferential tax treatment for Puerto Rican investments cannot justify what would otherwise be unsuitable concentrations of investors' portfolios in Puerto Rico municipal bonds. We focused our attention in that post on mainland municipal bond alternatives to Puerto Rican municipal bonds and showed that even...

Los Inversionistas Puertorriqueños No Debieron Invertir en los Fondos Puertorriqueños de UBS

(Feb 2015)

Durante el pasado año, hemos publicado en nuestro blog (aquí) una docena de comentarios sobre los fondos de bonos cerrados UBS Puerto Rico.

En nuestra entrada Impuestos, Bonos Municipales de Puerto Rico y los Fondos UBS mostramos cómo el trato preferencial impositivo que reciben las inversiones puertorriqueñas no puede justificar lo que sería un inadecuado nivel de concentración de bonos municipales de Puerto Rico en las carteras de los inversionistas. En esa entrada de blog, nos...

El Costo de 15 Días para los Clientes de UBS en Puerto Rico fue por Encima de $1 Billón

(Dec 2014)

En las últimas entradas a nuestro blog hemos demostrado que UBS suscribió $1.7 billones en bonos inmercadeables de la Administración de los Sistemas de Retiro (ASR) y los compró para colocarlos en sus Fondos UBS PR. Usted puede encontrar nuestra entrada anterior aquí. UBS creo cupo para estos bonos de la ASR al vender otros bonos no suscritos por UBS. UBS compró los bonos que suscribió de la ASR en el 2008 porque nadie más los compraría.

Recientemente, habíamos ilustrado como el conflicto de...

15 Days in Puerto Rico Cost UBS Clients Over $1 Billion

(Dec 2014)

We've shown in recent posts that UBS underwrote $1.7 billion of unmarketable ERS bonds and bought them into the UBS PR Funds. You can find our earlier blog posts here. UBS made room these ERS bonds by selling out of the Funds other bonds UBS didn't underwrite. UBS bought the ERS bonds it underwrote in 2008 because there was no other market for the bonds it was underwriting.

Recently we illustrated how UBS-underwritten conflicted bonds purchased by UBS into the funds in 2008 caused losses in...

Equipment Leasing DPPs

(Nov 2014)

We've written extensively about the evils of non-traded REITs. You can read through our other non-traded REIT blog posts. As bad as non-traded REITs are - and they're so bad no one should ever buy one - registered, non-traded Equipment Leasing Direct Participation Programs (DPPs) are worse.

Examples of equipment leasing DPPs include the series of LEAF and ICON trusts we discuss below. Equipment leasing DPPs provide a stark illustration of the DPP deceit which infects non-traded REITs,...

What Hell Hath UBS Puerto Rico Wrought

(Nov 2014)

We've shown in recent posts that UBS underwrote $1.7 billion of unmarketable ERS and $1.35 billion of COFINA bonds and bought them into the UBS PR Funds in 2007 and 2008. You can find our earlier blog posts on Puerto Rican Funds. UBS made room for these ERS and COFINA bonds by selling out of the Funds, roughly $3 billion of other bonds UBS didn't underwrite. UBS bought the ERS and COFINA bonds it underwrote in 2007 and 2008, because there was no other market for the bonds it was...

El Infierno Forjado por UBS Puerto Rico

(Nov 2014)

En entradas recientes al blog hemos demostrado que UBS suscribió $1.7 billones de bonos inmercadeables de la ASR y $1.35 billones de bonos de la COFINA y luego los compró para colocarlos en sus Fondos UBS PR en el 2007 y 2008. Pueden encontrar nuestra entrada anterior aquí. UBS hizo cabida a estos bonos de la COFINA y de la ASR vendiendo bonos que los Fondos tenían (alrededor de $3 billones) pero que no habían sido suscritos por UBS. UBS compró los bonos que suscribió en el 2007 y en el 2008...

En el 2007 y 2008, Los Fondos UBS PR También Compraron $1.35 Billones en Bonos de la COFINA Suscritos por UBS

(Nov 2014)

Ayer demostramos que en el 2008, UBS suscribió $1.7 billones de bonos inmercadeables de la ASR y los compró para sus Fondos UBS PR, disponible aquí. Hoy, mostraremos que del año 2007 al año 2008 conflictos similares llevaron a UBS a suscribir bonos inmercadeables de la Corporación del Fondo de Interés Apremiante (COFINA) para colocarlos en sus Fondos.

COFINA Serie 2007A

El banco de inversión UBS fue uno de los diecinueve co-suscritores de los $2.7 billones de bonos Serie A dirigidos a...

UBS PR Funds Also Bought $1.35 Billion of UBS Underwritten COFINA Bonds in 2007 and 2008

(Nov 2014)

Yesterday in our post "UBS Succumbed to Conflicts and Purchased $1.7 Billion of Employee Retirement System Bonds into its Puerto Rican Municipal bond Funds in 2008", we showed that UBS underwrote $1.7 billion of unmarketable ERS bonds and bought them into the UBS PR Funds in 2008. Today, we show similar conflicts led UBS to underwrite unmarketable 2007 and 2008 Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation (COFINA) bonds and stuff them into the Funds. COFINA issued two series of bonds in 2007...

UBS Succumbed to Conflicts and Purchased $1.7 Billion of Employee Retirement System Bonds into its Puerto Rican Municipal bond Funds in 2008

(Nov 2014)

In today's post we show that UBS underwrote unmarketable Employee Retirement System bonds and bought them into the UBS Funds in 2008. Friday, we'll show similar conflicts led UBS to underwrite unmarketable 2008 COFINA bonds and then stuff them into the UBS Funds.

The Puerto Rican Employee Retirement System was acutely and chronically underfunded. Figure 1 is a plot of the PR funding ratio and the median of the 50 states' funding ratios. The states median funding ratio fluctuated between 80%...

201 Results

<
1
...
3
4
5
6
7
...
21
>