Why Citigroup Paid the SEC $180 Million Over MAT/ASTA
(Aug 2015)
I. Introduction
This week Citigroup paid $180 million to the SEC to settle allegations that Citigroup improperly sold high risk hedge funds known as MAT, ASTA and Falcon. The SEC Order is available to view online.
The SEC Order makes clear that Citigroup did not effectively monitor the portfolio manager or the sales force as it sold billions of dollars of high risk MAT ASTA funds with false and misleading sales presentations. In the end, Citigroup lost hundreds of wealthy clients and likely...
A Non-traded REIT Investor Fights Back
(Jun 2015)
On June 5, 2015, I wrote that American Realty Capital's latest listing of a non-traded REIT was further evidence of the harm caused by sponsors of non-traded REITs. I also pointed out that, contrary to the common pattern in non-traded REIT listings, Schorsch and ARC used their control of the non-traded REIT version of GNL to tie the hands of shareholders and management in the subsequent GNL traded REIT and to opportunistically transfer wealth to themselves. I pointed out that similar...
Oil and Gas DPPs From Just Two Sponsors Have Caused $3.7 Billion in Losses
(Feb 2015)
We have written extensively about direct participation programs, or DPPs. See our blog posts on non-traded REITs and our discussion about equipment leasing DPPs. Oil and gas DPPs are another strain of the DPP epidemic: illiquid exposure to an existing underlying asset, loaded with confiscatory fees, conflicts of interest and unnecessary risk.
Oil and gas DPPs use some of investors' money to drill and operate oil and gas wells. Oil and gas DPPs are sponsored and managed either by investment...
Structured Product Based Variable Annuites are Riskier Than Advertised
(Feb 2014)
My colleagues and I have a paper in the current (Winter 2014) Journal of Retirement about structured product based variable annuities (spVAs), which are variable annuities with index-linked accounts that have a payoff similar to structured products. We have been following the market for spVAs since they were first introduced in 2010, and distributed our first working paper in 2011. Since then, three issuers have sold more than $3 billion worth of spVAs, according to a recent article in...
Credit Default Swaps on Steroids: UBS's Willow Fund
(Jan 2014)
We previously published a working paper on how investors in Oppenheimer's Champion Income Fund lost 80% in 2008 when peer group funds lost about 25%. Our Champion Income Fund paper is available on our website. Oppenheimer had increased Champion Income Fund's exposure to CMBS through credit default swaps and total return swaps in 2007 and 2008. Figure 1 reproduces a figure from our 2010 paper which demonstrates that the leverage Oppenheimer took on through the swaps fully explained the...
Behringer Harvard / TIER REIT Illustrates How Non-Traded REIT Sponsors and Brokers Have Siphoned $10 Billion to $20 Billion (and Counting) From Investors
(Jan 2014)
Sponsors have issued, and brokers had sold, over $85 billion of non-traded real estate investment trusts (REITs) by the end of 2012. These investments are illiquid, high-commissioned, poorly diversified real estate investments. Despite their glaring defects another $20 billion of non-traded REITs were sold to investors in 2013.
Sponsors and brokers have siphoned off at least $20 billion from investors through their sales of non-traded REITs up through 2012. We illustrate the calculation of...
Monte Carlo Simulation, Explained
(Nov 2013)
Valuing products with exotic derivatives can be difficult since these products typically have complex payoff formulas. One of the most flexible methods for valuing such products is called Monte Carlo simulation. At SLCG, we use Monte Carlo simulation in a lot of our work, so we thought it would be helpful to explain a bit about it and show how it can be used to estimate the future returns of an asset.
The basic idea behind Monte Carlo simulation is to determine the statistical properties...
Variable Annuity Fees Linked to the VIX -- Part II
(Nov 2013)
In our last post, we discussed a whitepaper that proposed linking the fees in a variable annuity to the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX). That paper ran a simple backtest of a variable annuity fee tied to the VIX over the period from 1990-2012, assuming certain parameters, and then compared the result to a fixed fee annuity over the same period. We have replicated their approach between January 1990 and January 2013 and found that not only are the fees and ending account values comparable, but so...
Variable Annuity Fees Linked to the VIX -- Part I
(Nov 2013)
We've discussed the CBOE Volatility Index -- known as the VIX-- many times before. Essentially, the VIX is a very complex calculation of the expected future variance of the S&P 500 (see the full calculation methodology), and is popularly known as the 'investor fear gauge'. The VIX is not a tradeable asset, but there are VIX options and futures contracts, and those contracts serve as the basis for several VIX-related exchange-traded products (TVIX, XIV, VXXto name a few). The VIX is very...
How Does VolDex Stack Up to the VIX?
(Nov 2013)
We've talked a lot about the idea of using volatility to hedge equity exposure. The basic finding, from our research work and that of others, is that the CBOE Volatility Index (VIX) hedges the S&P 500 fairly well. Unfortunately, the VIX is not investable, but is a complicated calculation based on a large strip of options contracts -- i.e., contracts of varying moneyness. Proxies for the VIX, such as rolling VIX futures strategies, are much worse hedges and have a number of problems that make...
