Research into "How Widespread and Predictable is Stock Broker Misconduct?" by SLCG indicates that prior customer complaints against individual brokers can indicate future complaints. McCann, Qin, and Yan discovered that including co-worker complaint histories significantly improves the ability to predict complaints against brokers who have not been previously complained about. They also found that customer complaints that were denied - not only settlements and awards - are useful in predicting future investor harm.
Egan, Matvos, and Seru's research underscores that, rather than eliminating underperforming brokers from the industry, the regulatory environment and labor market tend to funnel these brokers towards firms that hire individuals with disproportionately high numbers of customer complaints. These firms typically maintain loose hiring criteria and exhibit lenient compliance standards, specializing in exploiting inexperienced investors.
Dimmock et al. [2016], in a related study, discover that financial fraud exhibits contagious behavior. They reveal that a broker's likelihood of engaging in financial fraud is notably affected by the propensity of their colleagues to commit fraud, even after adjusting for firm culture, branch environment, market conditions, and state regulatory oversight.
Jason Lloyd Wongs current employer,
is one of the 30 highest risk brokerage firms measured by the percent of brokers at the firm who have customer complaints disclosed on their BrokerCheck reports. 16.77% of
's brokers have customer complaints compared to only 2.71% of all brokers who have complaints.
If you have questions about this post, about

and/or Jason Lloyd Wong or about the management of your accounts, please contact SLCG for an initial consultation or email us at
BrokerInquiry@SLCG.com.
Established in 2000, SLCG Economic Consulting ("SLCG") specializes in providing finance, economics, and investment management consulting, as well as expert witness services to law firms, banks, brokerage firms, and individuals involved in complex litigation. Our team comprises predominantly PhD and MA-level professionals with diverse backgrounds in academia, industry, and government, many of whom have testified in state and federal courts as well as various arbitration forums.
SLCG is a wholly owned subsidiary of McCann Yan Holdings, Inc., a Virginia incorporated company based in Northern Virginia.
Reference:
[1] S. Dimmock, W. Gerken, and N. Graham. "Is Fraud Contagious? Co-Worker Influence on Misconduct by Financial Advisors" The Journal of Finance Vol. 73, No. 3 June 2018.
[2] M. Egan, G. Matvos, and A. Seru. "The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct". Working paper, Journal of Political Economy Volume 127, Number 1, February 2019.
[3] C. McCann, C. Qin and M. Yan. "How Widespread and Predictable is Stock Broker Misconduct?" The Journal of Investing, Volume 26, Issue 2, Summer 2017.
[4] H. Qureshi and J. Sokobin. "Do Investors Have Valuable Information About Brokers?". Working paper, August 2015.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2652535