Research into "How Widespread and Predictable is Stock Broker Misconduct?" by SLCG indicates that prior customer complaints against individual brokers can indicate future complaints. McCann, Qin, and Yan discovered that including co-worker complaint histories significantly improves the ability to predict complaints against brokers who have not been previously complained about. They also found that customer complaints that were denied - not only settlements and awards - are useful in predicting future investor harm.
According to Egan, Matvos, and Seru, the regulatory landscape and job market do not effectively remove subpar brokers from the industry but rather direct them over time to firms that employ brokers with significantly more customer complaints. These brokerage firms, characterized by lenient hiring practices and minimal compliance standards, focus on targeting less knowledgeable investors.
Dimmock et al. [2016], in a related research endeavor, uncover that financial fraud spreads like a contagion. They ascertain that the likelihood of a broker engaging in financial fraud is significantly affected by the predisposition of their coworkers toward fraudulent behavior, even when accounting for firm culture, branch environment, market conditions, and state regulatory frameworks.
George Eugene Pitras current employer,
is one of the 30 highest risk brokerage firms measured by the percent of brokers at the firm who have customer complaints disclosed on their BrokerCheck reports. 16.77% of
's brokers have customer complaints compared to only 2.71% of all brokers who have complaints.
If you have questions about this post, about

and/or George Eugene Pitra or about the management of your accounts, please contact SLCG for an initial consultation or email us at
BrokerInquiry@SLCG.com.
Established in 2000, SLCG Economic Consulting ("SLCG") specializes in providing finance, economics, and investment management consulting, as well as expert witness services to law firms, banks, brokerage firms, and individuals involved in complex litigation. Our team comprises predominantly PhD and MA-level professionals with diverse backgrounds in academia, industry, and government, many of whom have testified in state and federal courts as well as various arbitration forums.
SLCG is a wholly owned subsidiary of McCann Yan Holdings, Inc., a Virginia incorporated company based in Northern Virginia.
Reference:
[1] S. Dimmock, W. Gerken, and N. Graham. "Is Fraud Contagious? Co-Worker Influence on Misconduct by Financial Advisors" The Journal of Finance Vol. 73, No. 3 June 2018.
[2] M. Egan, G. Matvos, and A. Seru. "The Market for Financial Adviser Misconduct". Working paper, Journal of Political Economy Volume 127, Number 1, February 2019.
[3] C. McCann, C. Qin and M. Yan. "How Widespread and Predictable is Stock Broker Misconduct?" The Journal of Investing, Volume 26, Issue 2, Summer 2017.
[4] H. Qureshi and J. Sokobin. "Do Investors Have Valuable Information About Brokers?". Working paper, August 2015.
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2652535